

SPECIFIC CALL FOR PAPERS TO THE WORKSHOP: « JOHN R. COMMONS'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF REGULATION »

1. GENERAL ORGANIZATION

As set out in the general presentation of the Conference (check on our website Recherche & Régulation), the organizers want to support collective research, on new or critical economic challenges, which in turn are questioning the researchers' practices and methods. With this prospect in mind, the scientific committee has selected this workshop topic—and nearly thirty other ones.

This specific call will help you to submit a paper to the organizers of this specific workshop (otherwise you should check on our website to submit to another workshop or as a varia).

Paper proposals will be examined by the organizers of the workshop and by the scientific committee according to the schedule and requirements below:

SCHEDULE AND FORMAL REQUIREMENTS.

ÉCHÉANCE	DATE LIMITE
Paper proposals Approximately 500 words + maximum 10 bibliographic references (languages: either French or English)	November 1, 2014. Response from the scientific committee: December 15, 2014.
Final versions of complete papers (for both varia and special workshops) Approximately 8,000 words except for "state of the art" papers that are limited to 2,500 words + maximum 15 bibliographic references	April 15, 2015
Conference : June 10-12, 2015 (Paris)	

FORMATS. The topics addressed by the contributions to the Research and Regulation 2015 Conference are not limited, but the submitted papers must clearly set out how they are positioned: within epistemological or theoretical issues; conceptual or empirical; whether they present results, a survey or a programmatic approach.

The committee will also examine proposals that sum up state-of-the-art knowledge in specific areas, whether methodological or field-based. ¹

Besides, selected presentations will be proposed for publication in a variety of formats, such as peer-reviewed journals, books or proceedings; specifics will be provided by the organizers prior to the Conference.

2. ORGANIZER OF THE WORKSHOP

- Hiroyuki UNI (Kyoto University) and
- Bruno Théret (IRISSO-CNRS, université Paris-Dauphine),

3. SCIENTIFIC ORIENTATION OF THE WORKSHOP

In this workshop, we shall mainly discuss J. R. Commons' Institutional Economics to confirm whether or not it is possible to contribute to the development of Régulation Theory.

An evaluation to old American institutionalism including Commons might have been fixed in economics without enough discussion about the theories. For instance, for R. Coase whose statement has been commonly reproduced, 'John. R. Commons, Wesley Mitchell, and those associated with them (...) were anti-theoretical, and without a theory to bind together their collection of facts.' Moreover Commons' economics cannot be evaluated only by focusing on his contribution to 'labor economics' or the takeover and introduction into mainstream economics of his concept of transaction by Coase and Williamson. The economics of Commons was constructed on a concept of 'institution' which has originality even in a contemporary

¹ Be aware that such state-of-the-art papers must follow formal constraints (see section "Event Organization" below).

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view: 'collective action that controls individual action'. His theoretical framework is much familiar with the modern institutional economics, especially the theory of Régulation and convention economics.

Based on these premises, we may seek for a possible theoretical synthesis of Commons' institutional economics and Régulation theory. For this aim, we have to examine some crucial theoretical points in these two theories. Firstly, we have to examine concepts of institution, institutional change and institutionalized compromise, taking into account all analytical levels of politics, economy, and ethics. Commons' concept of Order is very similar to the concept of institutionalized compromise in the theory of Régulation because, according to Commons, Order is the result of conflict, and is based on "Reasonable Value". Secondly, related to the above, we have to rethink Commons' concept of Reasonable Value in a broader macroeconomic framework like accumulation regime. Thirdly, we have to reinterpret Commons' concept of "going concern" as the social Actors obeying the institution. In our understanding, Commons' going concern is an institutional mediation within social structure between individual actors and the social whole. According to him, going concerns as such an institutional mediation have to be considered simultaneously through five different principles of valuation of the behaviour of individual and collective actors, that is, Efficiency, Scarcity, Sovereignty, Custom, and Futurity. Reasonable value (social regulation aiming at stabilizing the capitalist economy) which organizes the complementarity and hierarchy between these five principles of building institutions.

Based on the discussions in this workshop, we hope to develop both Commons' institutional economics and the theory of Régulation.

Provisionally, we prospect application of the following six researchers on this special session. Additional applications are welcome:

- Hiroyuki UNI (Kyoto University) "J.R. Commons' Concept of Reasonable Value as a Result of Régulation".
- Jean-Jacques Gislain and Bruno Théret (CNRS, université Paris Dauphine)
 "Institutions, action collective et régulation dans l'économie institutionnelle de John Commons".
- Takayuki NAKAHARA (Hannan University) "Conflict, Order, and Interdependence: Confusion of the Concept of Order on J. R. Commons and the Concept of "Régulation".
- Kota KITAGAWA (Graduate student, Kyoto University) "The uniqueness of Cumulative Causation in J.R. Commons' Institutional Economics".
- Takao TSUKAMOTO (Nihon University) "J. R. Commons' View on T. Veblen's Economics: On his Intangible Property and Good-will".
- Shingo TAKAHASHI (College of Tokyo Traffic) "J. R. Commons' Administrative Approach".



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TO SUBMIT A PAPER

1. PAPER PROPOSAL

To be considered, a paper proposal should be presented in a word-processing document that respects the following requirements:

First page: Paper title, professional status and contacts of author (if co-authors, use **boldface** for the correspondant)

Second page: Abstract in French and English (maximum 10 lines each, with 5 key words)

Third and fourth page:

— A summary presenting a detailed outline that addresses the following questions: What is the starting point? What is the key idea or argument? What is going to be demonstrated? Which scientific questioning and heuristic framework (and the theoretical or conceptual elements on which they are based)? What methodology is used? (when appropriate: what is the state of the art of which scientific issue?)

A bibliography indicating the key references that will guide the author (10 maximum)

Proposals will be evaluated by the scientific committee according to the "double blind" procedure.

2. FULL PAPER

The definitive text must be received according to the calendar above in a digital word-processing file (Arial 10pt, single line spacing; margins 2.5 cm).

First page: Paper title, professional status and contacts of author (if co-authors, use **boldface** for the correspondant).

Second page: Abstract in French and English (maximum 10 lines each, with 5 key words)

Text: maximum 8,000 words.

Note that each paper will be evaluated for possible publication after the colloquium, in a peer-reviewed journal or edited volume.

CONTACT US

Proposals and full papers will be sent to the organizers of the workshop (<u>Bruno.Theret@dauphine.fr</u> and <u>uni@econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp</u>) with a copy to the organizers of the conference (<u>rr2015@upmf-grenoble.fr</u>).